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Voluntary actions are accompanied by a distinctive subjective experience, so that they feel
quite different from physically similar involuntary movements. However, the nature and
origin of this experience of volition remain unclear. Voluntary actions emerge during early
childhood, in parallel with reduction of involuntary movements. However, the available
markers of the experience of volition, notably Libet's mental chronometry of intention,
cannot readily be used in young children. In Gilles de la Tourette syndrome (GTS), however,
involuntary tic movements may coexist with voluntary control into adulthood. Therefore,
adolescents with GTS could potentially confuse the two classes of movement. We have
measured the temporal experience of voluntary action in a well-characterised group of
adolescents with GTS, and age-matched controls. We replicated previous reports of a
conscious intention occurring a few hundred milliseconds prior to voluntary keypress
actions. Multiple regression across 25 patients' results showed that age and trait tic severity
did not influence the experience of conscious intention. However, patients with stronger
premonitory urges prior to tics showed significantly later conscious intentions, suggesting
that the anticipatory experience of one's own volition involves a perceptual discrimination
between potentially competing pre-movement signals. Patients who were more able to
voluntarily suppress their tics showed significantly earlier conscious intention, suggesting
that the perceptual discrimination between different action classes may also contribute to
voluntary control of tics. We suggest that the brain learns voluntary control by perceptually
discriminating a special class of internal ‘intentional’ signals, allowing them to emerge
from motor noise.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).e Neuroscience, 17 Quee
aggard).
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Human societies assume that individuals voluntarily control
their actions, yet the neurobiological basis of volitional control
is hardly understood. Voluntary control emerges gradually
with the development and maturation of cortical motor
structures: newborn infants move continually, but seem to
have little voluntary control over their movements (Piaget,
1952). Societies recognise this progressive development of
voluntary control by defining ages of criminal responsibility,
although the specific age point shows notable cultural varia-
tions. These biological and social notions of volition are based
not only on physiological facts about the motor system, but
also on descriptions of the subjective experience of voluntary
action. Themental life of healthy adults includes a continuous
and coherent experience of agency related to future, present
and past actions (James, 1890). This sense of voluntary control
over one's actions is essential in order to accept responsibility.
In contrast, involuntary movements (reflexes, spasms) are
classed as “automatisms” that are not under an individual's
voluntary control.
The developmental trajectory from unstructured, involun-
tary motor acts to dominance of volitional actions and
conscious self-control has been described by developmental
psychologists (Piaget, 1952). However, experimental data are
scarce, because the critical changes occur in early life, before
formal testing and subjective report are possible. Acquiring
voluntary control over one's own bodily actions presumably
involves a form of instrumental learning. Experiences of voli-
tion and motivation are repeatedly paired with goal-directed
body movements, and with rewarding outcomes (Balleine,
2011; Fetz, 1969, 2007). In contrast, other, involuntary move-
ments simply occur, without any associated experience of
volition. Learning associations between a feeling of volition, a
bodymovement, and a subsequent external eventwould allow
one to learn tobevoluntary (Haggard, Clark,&Kalogeras, 2002).
In developmental tic disorders, however, this progressive
dominance of voluntary action over involuntary movement is
altered. Gilles de la Tourette's syndrome (GTS), for example,
affects approximately 1% of children and adolescents
(Robertson, Eapen, & Cavanna, 2009). It is characterised by
tics, involuntary, patterned and repetitive exaggerated
movements and vocalisations misplaced in context and time
with a mean onset around the age of 7 years (Robertson et al.,
2009). This disorder provides a valuable opportunity for
studying the emergence of volition at a critical stage. In GTS,
movements that may be behaviourally similar become clas-
sified as voluntary actions, or as involuntary tics. The main
evidence for this classification is often a parent or caregiver's
judgement regarding whether a movement is ‘appropriate’
(inappropriate implies involuntary) and how often it is
repeated (voluntary actions are often quite sporadic, while
involuntary movements are often repetitive). Since children
appear to lack a strong phenomenal awareness of all their
actions, both voluntary and involuntary, this classification is
generally third-person rather than first-person in origin.
Indeed, tics in GTS have features of both volitional and
involuntary movements: they are generated by the brain's
voluntary motor pathways (Bohlhalter et al., 2006), yet theyare experienced as involuntary or unwanted. We hypoth-
esised that the presence of tics might lead to blurring of the
normal boundaries between voluntary and involuntary
movement, and an impaired perception of the different sub-
jective experiences accompanying these two distinct kinds of
action. For example, many GTS patients are able to suppress
their tics voluntarily, yet report the tic itself as involuntary or
imposed (Ganos et al., 2012). GTS patients often report “pre-
monitory urges” prior to tics. These may resemble somatic
sensations such as itches (Jackson, Parkinson, Kim,
Schu¨ermann, & Eickhoff, 2011), but may also resemble the
experience before voluntary actione for example theymay be
accompanied by Readiness Potentials (Karp, Porter, Toro, &
Hallett, 1996; van der Salm, Tijssen, Koelman, & van
Rootselaar, 2012). These features set tics apart from other
extra movements in children, e.g., transient postural chorea,
that are perceived as completely automatic and uncontrolla-
ble. Tics are thus located in the borderland between voluntary
and involuntary action. Patients often report partial control
for some time until urges become irresistible and they are
forced to tic. One recent study offers some direct support for
the hypothesis that tics might mask normal volition. Moretto
et al. showed that adults with GTS have an altered experience
of their own volition (Moretto, Schwingenschuh, Katschnig,
Bhatia, & Haggard, 2011), using Libet's paradigm for report-
ing “W judgements” e the perceived time of intentions pre-
ceding voluntary action (Libet, Wright, & Gleason, 1983).
The relation between voluntary and involuntary move-
ment in GTS could also clarify the bases of “conscious free
will” in the healthy brain. On one view, intention to act is a
perception-like experience that occurs when activity within
frontal motor networks exceeds a threshold level (Fried,
Mukamel, & Kreiman, 2011; Hallett, 2007; Matsuhashi &
Hallett, 2008). On this view, the increased level of “motor
noise” in GTSmight require a more conservative threshold for
detecting volition, in order to avoid excessive sensitivity to
noise. This increased threshold would in turn produce delays
in the perceived urge to move (Hallett, 2007) (see Fig. 1). This
view therefore predicts that tic parameters should correlate
with mean W judgement.
Studies of developmental tic disorders could therefore
potentially clarify the processes whereby voluntary control
emerges from the wider noise of involuntary sensorimotor
activity, and becomes a characteristic cognitive and
phenomenological event. In particular, we speculated that the
experience of volition in GTS could resemble a perception-like
signal detection process, rather than a post hoc explanation of
actions. Investigating this hypothesis would also provide an
important window into the learning process assumed to un-
derlie the normal development of capacity for voluntary ac-
tion. We therefore tested the experience of volition in 27
adolescents with GTS, and 30 healthy volunteers, using a
cross-sectional design. We hypothesised that high levels of
tics would be associated with delays in the normal experience
of volition, because the characteristic neural activities that
signal one's own volition would be lost in motor noise,
delaying awareness of one's own intentions. As a control for
non-specific features of the task unrelated to volition, patients
and controls also judged the perceived time of the keypress
action itself.
Fig. 1 e A simple model of conscious intention as a signal detection problem. A. Experience of intention (W) occurs when
motor activation exceeds a first threshold level. Actual movement onset (M) occurs whenmotor activation reaches a second,
higher threshold. B. Motor noise produces a wide range (W1eW3) during which experience of intention could occur,
possibly more than once C. Increasing the threshold level for experience of intention (grey arrow) prevents extensive
sensitivity to noise but delays experience of intention.
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2.1. Clinical evaluation
Twenty-seven adolescents (21 male) diagnosed with GTS aged
between 10 and 17 years (mean age 13.7 years ± 2.3 SD) were
recruited from the GTS outpatient clinic in the Department of
Neurology, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf
(clinical characteristics given in Supplementary Table 1). In
two cases wewere unable to collect scores on all clinical tests,
so only 25 patients could be included in correlation analyses.
The control group comprised 30 age-matched healthy control
subjects (16 male, mean age 13 years ± 2.2 SD; range 10e17).
All subjects and their parents gave their written informed
consent prior to study participation. The studywas performed
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and was
approved by the local ethics committee (PV4049).
All subjects underwent a thorough clinical assessment
(A.M., C.G.) based on a semi-structured neuropsychiatric
interview adapted from Robertson and Eapen (Robertson &
Eapen, 1996). DSM-IV-TR criteria were used for a diagnosis of
GTS (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Tic severity was
determined using the Yale Global Tic Severity Scale (YGTSS)
(Leckman et al., 1989) and the Modified Rush Video Scale
(MRVS) (Goetz, Pappert, Louis, Raman, & Leurgans, 1999). The
potential to voluntarily inhibit tics was assessed by asking
patients to maximally suppress their tics for 2  2.5 min while
being videotaped [head and shoulders and whole body view,
respectively; previously described (Ganos et al., 2012)]. Tic
inhibition potential (IP) was calculated as follows:
IP¼ (RF RI)/RF, where RF (Rush Free) and RI (Rush Inhibition)
were MRVS-based tic scores during “free ticcing” and tic in-
hibition respectively. Video sequences of healthy controls
were also screened for the presence of tics by medical stu-
dents trained in tic recognition (L. A., J. B.). No tics were noted
in healthy controls.
The Tourette syndrome Diagnostic Confidence Index (DCI)
was used to assess lifetime GTS-associated symptoms
(Robertson et al., 1999). Premonitory urges were assessed
using the validated German version of the Premonitory Urgefor Tics Scale (PUTS) (R€ossner, K, & Neuner, 2010; Woods,
Piacentini, Himle, & Chang, 2005).
All participants were screened for major comorbidities as
follows. For Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD),
the “Fremdbeurteilungsbogen fu¨r Aufmerksamkeits/Hyper-
aktivit€atsst€orungen” (FBB-ADHS) from the “Diagnostik-Sys-
tem fu¨r Psychische St€orungen nach ICD 10 und DSM-IV fu¨r
Kinder und Jugendliche II (DISYPS-II) (D€opfner, G€ortz-Dorten,
& Lehmkuhl, 2008) was used. This is a 20-item questionnaire
(final score 0e3) reflecting both DSM-IV and ICD-10 diagnostic
criteria commonly employed in German paediatric population
with good reliability and content validity (D€opfner et al., 2008).
The items were completed by participants' parents.
Obsessive-compulsive symptoms were captured by the Chil-
dren's Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (CY-BOCS)
(Goodman et al., 1989; Scahill et al., 1997). The CY-BOCS is a
clinician-rated scale that assesses symptom severity as well
as type of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Ten of the 19
items of the scale comprise the total score which ranges from
0 to 40. Finally, the German version of the Children's Depres-
sion Rating Scale -Revised (CDRS-R) (Keller et al., 2011), a 17-
item semistructured clinician-based interview, was employed
to capture the presence and severity of depressive symptoms
in participants. Clinical data are presented in Supplementary
Table 1.
2.2. Behavioural task
We used Libet et al.'s method (Libet et al., 1983) to measure
the experiences associated with voluntary action. Briefly,
participants viewed a small clock hand rotating within a dial
every 2560 msec. They were instructed to make a simple
keypress action at a time of their own choosing, noting the
position of the clock hand when they first detected the
intention to “move now” (cf. “feel the urge to move”, in Libet's
original words). Patients with GTS were given no particular
instruction regarding ticcing during this task. The mean time
between conscious intention and keypress is typically a few
hundred ms, and has been used as an index of the strength of
volition. For example, judgements of intention are delayed in
adults with GTS (Moretto et al., 2011), patients with parietal
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tremor (Edwards et al., 2011), suggesting they provide a
valuable indication of the experience of volition. The stan-
dard deviation of repeated judgements provides an addi-
tional, independent measure of experience, akin to
phenomenal clarity and precision. For example, vague and
variable phenomenology of volition should produce a high
standard deviation of intention judgements, while a clear
experience that reliably precedes actions by a fixed latency
should produce a lower standard deviation. As a control for
non-specific aspects of the Libet task, including using the
rotating clock hand as a chronometric device for timing
subjective experiences, we asked participants to perform an
additional block of trials in which they judged the time of
their actual keypress, rather than the intention that caused
it. Trial order was counterbalanced between the two judge-
ment conditions. The means and standard deviations of 40
intention judgements and of 40 action judgements were
estimated for each subject.2.3. Multiple regression analysis
To investigate the relation between tic behaviour and expe-
rience of volition, we used a multiple regression model to
predict the mean time of intention across participants. We
used a range of predictor variables covering two main do-
mains: First, we included three tic-related predictors: overall
actual tic severity (RF), premonitory urges (PUTS scores), and
capacity for intentional suppression of tics (IP). In addition, we
included two general, non-tic-related factors likely to influ-
ence conscious intention. These were the degree of attention
deficit (FBB-ADHS), and the reliability of each individual's W
judgement (SD W), which partly reflects the criterion used to
judge the onset of intention. The detailed justification for each
of these predictors is given in Supplementary Text 1.
Finally, in order to assess, whether GTS has a specific effect
on perception of intentions, without generally altering time
estimation or perceptual judgement about othermotor events
such as actions, a separate regression was performed for
judgements of the keypress action (M-judgement), using the
same regression model as for judgements of intention..525**
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Fig. 2 e Regressionmodel for predicting time of conscious intent
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explanation.3. Results
3.1. Between group analyses
The experience of intention (mean of Libet's W judgement)
occurred at a similar time in patients (mean e 184 msec ± 147
SD) and controls (mean e 185 msec ± 97 SD). Also, the esti-
mated time of the keypress (M-judgement) was comparable
between patients (mean e 56msec ± 56) and controls (mean e
68 ± 46). Comparison of volition measures between GTS pa-
tients and healthy volunteers yielded no significant effect of
group (F1,55 ¼ .094, NS). There was an expected difference
between the perceived time of intention and the perceived
time of action (F1,55¼ 72.536, p < .001), but no interaction with
group (F1,55 ¼ .124, NS). Thus, in this group of adolescents we
did not replicate the delayed experience of volition found
previously in GTS adults (Moretto et al., 2011). Given the
relatively large size of our study compared to previous studies,
this is unlikely to reflect lack of statistical power.
3.2. Multiple regression analysis within the patient
group
The overall model fitted the data well (F5,19¼ 7.996, p¼ .0003),
explaining 82.3% of the variance. The contributions (beta
weight values) of each variable in predicting mean time of
intention are shown in Fig. 2. The correlation matrix and
partial regression test table are shown in Supplementary
Table 2. Regarding specific tic-related factors, we found that
tic severity was unrelated to W judgements. Greater capacity
for intentional tic suppression was associated with earlier W
judgements. Stronger premonitory urges were associated
with later W judgements. Regarding general non tic-specific
factors, higher ADHD ratings were associated with later W
judgements. Greater trial-to-trial variability in judgements of
intention (SD W) was associated with earlier W judgements.
3.3. Judgements of keypress actions
We fitted the same regression model to the patients' judge-
ments of the keypress action (M judgements). We did not find-.451
**
.418**
General perceptual factors
Judgement 
variability
Perceptual 
attention
ess 
on
ion (W judgement) in the GTS group. Numbers indicate beta
at measure is associated with earlier intention. Thin lines
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from significant (F5,19 ¼ 0.823, p ¼ .549, r2 ¼ .178: see
Supplementary Table 3). This suggests that the associations
reported for conscious intention reflect the specific perceptual
ambiguities of volition, rather than interactions between tics
and general features of the task, such as using the rotating
clock. Interestingly, judgements of keypress actions did not
show the significant relation between mean and standard
deviation that had previously been found for judgements of
intentions.We suggest that the association between themean
and standard deviation of judgements using the Libet method
may reflect individual differences in setting perceptual
criteria. For a clear and unambiguous signal such as a key-
press, choice of criterion may be more straightforward, and
more consistent across individuals.When judging events with
a more tenuous phenomenology such as volition, choosing a
more liberal criterionwill produce an earlier butmore variable
W judgement.
3.4. Control group
We could not use the same regression model to predict
conscious intention in the control group, because they had no
scores on the clinical measures. However, our hypothesis that
individual differences in criterion setting produce a relation
between mean and standard deviation of intention judge-
ments could be tested also in the control group. A simple
linear regression confirmed a significant relation in the same
direction as for the patients (F1,28¼ 4.518, p¼ .0425). However,
this regressor explained around half as much variance (13.9%)
as in the patient group (27.9%). This result suggests that the
relation between mean and standard deviation of time of
intention is driven by a general factor present in both groups.
This factor may not be specifically related to tics, although the
presence of ticsmaymake its expression stronger. Indeed, the
standard deviation of W judgement was both nonsignificantly
greater and more variable across individuals in the patient
group, compared to controls [mean 205 msec, SD 171 msec for
patients, mean 161 msec SD 142 msec for controls: t-test on
mean of SDs: t(55) ¼ 1.07, p ¼ .289].4. Discussion
4.1. Volition in adolescent and adult GTS populations
We found no difference in the average time of conscious
intention between GTS patients and controls in our group of
adolescents.Aprevious studyhad reportedadelay in conscious
intention in adults with GTS relative to controls (Moretto et al.,
2011) but this result was not replicated in our younger and
larger sample. The absence of delay in adolescence combined
with delayed experience of volition in adultswith GTS suggests
that adults may learn the experience of volition. In healthy
adults, the normal experience of intention prior to voluntary
action may reflect prolonged perceptual learning at discrimi-
nating the internal signals that characterise volition. Persistent
co-occurrence of voluntary and involuntary movement in GTS
could make this discrimination problem harder. Therefore,
patients with GTSmay show delayed learning about their ownvolition, or may extinguish such learning after it has occurred,
as a result of prolonged tic behaviour. Adults have prolonged
experience of their own voluntary action, and may have
learned the discriminative perceptual markers of volition.
However, for an adult with GTS, frequent tics may have made
this discrimination harder, leading to a more conservative cri-
terion for detecting the signal among noise. GTS adults may
thus lack the normal anticipatory awareness of intentional
action. In our adolescent sample, the two groups do not yet
diverge in this way. That is, we suggest that the delayed expe-
rience of volition in adult GTS represents a failure of perceptual
learning for volition-related signals, due tomasking by tics and
tic-related factors, such as premonitory urges. Some possible
factors are discussed in the next section.
4.2. Factors affecting volition in GTS
GTS is characterised by tics. Our results showed several in-
fluences of ticcing on the experience of voluntary action.
These results are consistent with the broad theory that the
experience of volition involves learning a perceptual discrimi-
nation between the distinctive internal states and signals
corresponding to preparation of voluntary actions, and other,
involuntary body movements. For example, a striking result
of our regression analysis was that subjective experiences
linked to involuntary tic movements (measured by the PUTS)
provided the single strongest predictor of volition. Partici-
pants who experienced strong premonitory urges prior to tics
had a later perception of the intention preceding voluntary
action. Stronger premonitory urges preceding involuntary
movements could impair detection of the distinctive experi-
ence of volition, since urges to tic would constitute percep-
tual noise masking actual intentions. In contrast, the objective
occurrence of tic behaviours, measured by the established
Rush video scoring method, did not predict the experience of
volition. More generally, our results suggest that both
voluntary and other types of movements are accompanied by
subjective experiences, each with their own perceptual
characteristics. The perceptual ability to distinguish between
these experiences, and process and control each class of
movement accordingly, lies at the heart of the capacity for
volition.
Patients with GTS are widely stated to have intact volun-
tary action (Moretto et al., 2011), with the presence of parallel
involuntary movements being the main pathology. However,
the co-occurrence of these two classes of movement in-
troduces a perceptual problem in distinguishing between
them. Involuntary movements constitute a perceptual
learning challenge. During normal development, children
may learn to recognise the signals corresponding to the de-
sires, preparations and goals that drive voluntary actions,
despite the constant presence of general motor noise arising
from other, involuntary movements of the body. One
consequence of such motor noise is a variability in judging
when a phenomenally-thin event, such as intention to act,
occurs within the motor system. Indeed, we found that the
mean perceived time of an event was positively correlated
with the variability in timing judgements, in both GTS and
control groups. In GTS, this perceptual learning problem may
be exacerbated by three factors. First, the level of this noise is
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Second, tics may be difficult to discriminate from voluntary
actions, because they involve the same neural motor circuits,
and often have the same physical form as a voluntary action.
Third, tics are noted and commented on by others including
parents and peers. There are often implicit or explicit re-
quests to stop ticcing. This may foster a process of attending
to tics. Increased attention may in turn produce strong sub-
jective experiences associated with tic generation processes,
masking the experience of voluntary action generation. Thus,
the child with GTS may have particular difficulty in
discriminating the internal signals corresponding to their
truly voluntary actions, in the presence of this ongoing
activity.
4.3. Volition as a signal-in-noise problem
We therefore suggest that the experience of one's own voli-
tion, as measured by the perceived time of intentions to
perform a simple voluntary action, begins as a perceptual
problem of detecting signals in noise. The individual must
detect a specific internal motor signal of volition in the pres-
ence of ongoing, background motor noise. This problem is
most acute in early childhood, where involuntary movements
are relatively frequent. Our view strongly contrasts with
alternative accounts suggesting that conscious intention is a
retrospective inference to account for actions after they have
occurred. According to retrospective theories, the ‘experience’
of intention should depend largely on retrospective con-
struction of an apparent mental cause of our actions (Wegner,
2002), and not on the nature, or noise context, of internal
signals that preceded the action. In contrast, the signal-in-
noise view suggests that experience of volition occurs when
an internal signal exceeds a criterion value, or crosses a
threshold. Patients with GTS vary in the level of motor noise
associated with tics, and also in the perceptual awareness and
intentional controllability surrounding their tics. Our results
show that these latter factors strongly influence the experi-
ence of volition in GTS. Therefore, patients with GTSmay face
a greater difficulty than controls in the crucial perceptual
computation to separate one's own volitional actions from
other movements.
Could a retrospective, inferential account of intention also
explain the results in GTS patients? Retrospective accounts
would suggest that experiences of volition are inserted post
hoc, whenever a patient moves. In GTS, this process would
occur both after voluntary actions, and also after tics. This
retrospective insertion might potentially explain some pre-
monitory urges e although many urges build up over a much
longer timescale than the subsecond timescales associated
with retrospective insertion of intentions.Crucially, however,
a retrospective account of GTS action awareness would sug-
gest that a patient who strongly reconstructs urges should
also strongly reconstruct intentions. In our dataset, high PUTS
scores should then be associated with early W judgements. In
fact, we found a strong effect in the opposite direction.
Therefore, our results seem more consistent with the idea of
perceptual learning of a premotor signal, rather than a general
inferential mechanism for retrospective insertion of
intentions.4.4. Threshold-setting and judgements of conscious
intention
A recent computational model rejected the notion of volition
as a hierarchical top-down control of the motor system, and
suggested instead that random fluctuations of a motor read-
iness signal could be sufficient to explain the initiation of
voluntary actions (Schurger, Sitt, & Dehaene, 2012). Our result
is consistent with the view that people also experience an
intention to act when an internal signal exceeds an in-
dividual's threshold level (Hallett, 2007). The choice of
threshold leads to a relation between the average time of
conscious intention, and its trial-to-trial variability. We veri-
fied this prediction in both GTS and the control group. Setting
a suitable threshold level for the neural signals that produce
the thin and ambiguous experience of volition is a perceptual
challenge. Setting a low threshold will regularly produce false
positives. These individuals would show early detection of
intention on average, but their judgements would be highly
susceptible to motor noise. In contrast, an individual who
chooses a high threshold would be less susceptible to noise.
However, the high threshold would be crossed only late in the
motor preparation sequence, leading to a delayed experience
of volition. We show that this idiosyncratic variation exists in
the general population, as well as in GTS. However, this factor
has a stronger influence in GTS, perhaps reflecting the greater
challenge of threshold-setting in this group for whom motor
noise levels are unusually high.
4.5. Relation to self-control and voluntary initiation of
action
We have studied the subjective experience of volition, rather
than the objective capacity to initiate and control voluntary
action. Nevertheless, our results suggest an interesting link
between subjective experience of volition and capacity for
voluntary control. Voluntary control is classically thought to
be unaffected in pure GTS (Ganos et al., 2014; Ganos, Roessner,
& Munchau, 2013; Jung, Jackson, Parkinson, & Jackson, 2012),
and our patients were indeed able to perform the voluntary
action task successfully. However, we found a strong relation
in our patients between a negative aspect of voluntary control,
i.e., the capacity to suppress tics, and the capacity to experi-
ence the intentional signals preceding initiation of voluntary
action. Specifically, participants who were able to suppress
their tics reported earlier experiences of volition that those
who did not. Importantly, these two measures were obtained
independently, in separate experimental tests e no particular
instruction was given regarding tic inhibition during the
voluntary action task.
This result suggests that the capacity to discriminate sig-
nals for volition from signals related to other involuntary
movements is directly related to successful voluntary self-
control. The capacity to inhibit involuntary movements
could cause a stronger experience of volition, by reducing the
background motor noise within which signals related to
voluntary action are embedded. This would improve the
landscape for perceptual learning. However, we cannot
exclude the possibility that causation might run in the oppo-
site direction. Patients who have early experiences of volition
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involuntary movements that lacked this marker. Our result
establishes, for the first time, an association between
perception of volition, and voluntary self-control, although it
cannot prove the direction of causation. Irrespective of
directionality, the association between experience of volition
and voluntary self-control may have important implications
for movement disorder therapies. For example, training that
focuses on perception of internal volitional signals rather than
on noise related to tics could potentially increase voluntary
self-control.
4.6. Implications for development of volition
The ability to perceive the signals associated with volition,
and to discriminate them from other internal motor events, is
a crucial first stage in developing the capacity for voluntary
control. Humans might acquire volition using mechanisms
similar to reinforcement learning of operant actions in ani-
mals (Fetz, 1969). A gradual, implicit learning process would
favour motor outputs that influenced the level of a specific
class of sensations, associated with drives, desires and moti-
vations e such as reducing hunger or inducing pleasure.
People may learn to be voluntary, by the same general prin-
ciples that biofeedback training uses to allow voluntary con-
trol over heart rate, and other autonomic processes (Lehrer
et al., 2003). Learning may be delayed or compromised if the
signals that cause voluntary action cannot be successfully
identified or discriminated from background noise generated
by movements that are not so readily controlled.
We began this paper by distinguishing between perceptual
theories of volition based on detection of internal preparatory
signals (Fried et al., 2011; Hallett, 2007; Matsuhashi & Hallett,
2008), and retrospective theories based on inferences about
the causes of one's own actions (Dennett, 1991; Wegner, 2002).
If our suggestion of volition as developmental perceptual
learning is correct, then the contrast between perceptual and
inferential theories appears rather contrived. We speculate
that infants would be retrospective inferentialists: they learn
in early life that particular internal sensations of wanting and
striving are associated with particular motor actions, and that
these actions influence the corresponding internal sensations.
That is, the infant would learn by repeated Hebbian associa-
tion that some particular sensory states were under voluntary
control. To learn this association, the developing brain must
extract the correlation between an internal premotor signal or
premotor sensation, and the resulting body movement. Social
rewards for particular movements, such as smiling, act as
powerful reinforcers for learning this association. With repe-
tition, the infant comes to perceive the special relation be-
tween those specific internal signals and their external
consequences. Because associations support predictions, the
infant will begin to perceive volition before the action itself.
Adults can develop novel methods of voluntary control
through neurobiofeedback training (Fetz, 1969; Hatsopoulos &
Donoghue, 2009; Lebedev & Nicolelis, 2006). We suggest that
basic control of voluntary body movements begins with a
similar process, of learning to perceive internal signals. By
learning to discriminate and consciously perceive signals that
correspond to development of motor action, individuals mayacquire fine voluntary control over their actions. In GTS, the
child is faced with multiple well-formed movements that do
not correspond to their intentions. In our GTS group, we
showed that individuals' experience of intention could be
explained because of the difficulty of discriminating inten-
tional actions from this involuntary motor noise.
4.7. Limitations and future directions
Finally, we point out several limitations with our study. First,
our suggestions regarding the role of development in learning
volition are rather speculative, because they are based on a
cross-sectional, rather than a longitudinal study. Longitudinal
studies with GTS could be particularly valuable for studying
the relation between motor noise and experience of volition,
because tic disorders often spontaneously resolve in children
with GTS. Our model predicts that these naturally-occurring
changes in levels of motor noise should be followed by
changes in the experience of voluntary action. Second, our
study is relatively small [though larger than previous experi-
mental studies of volition in GTS (Moretto et al., 2011)].
Further, some patients had to be excluded from the crucial
correlation analysis, because some measures were unavai-
lable. Future studies with a larger sample would be better
placed to investigate whether comorbid OCD and depression
influence the experience of volition. Larger studies might also
fruitfully use factor analysis methods. We have shown how a
range of dependent measures is associated with the experi-
ence of volition. Factor analysis may help to reveal whether
these can be reduced to a smaller number of factors, each
reflecting the contribution of a specific neural substrate.
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